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A FINAL WORD ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE
HODGES CASE
KENNETH C. DAviS0
Mr. Donley's reply to my article of last June is especially
welcome because it again directs attention to a West Virginia
problem which deserves more extensive recognition and because it
contributes to the discussion a point of view which is widely at
variance with that of the original article. The difference of opinion
is so fundamental that Mr. Donley's substantial agreement with
one of my conclusions may be of particular significance: that if
the West Virginia court follows the interpretation given the
separation-of-powers clause in four recent cases, a large portion
of all existing West Virginia legislation setting up administrative
agencies will be found unconstitutional.' Of course, I believe that
the prospect of such wholesale invalidation of our laws on sup-
posed constitutional grounds serves only to emphasize that the
court's interpretation is unduly strict and that the recent decisions
should be limited or overruled.
Unlike Mr. Donley, I believe that the separation-of-powers
clause should not be interpreted as if it were a provision of a con-
tract or a deed. 2 I envy Mr. Donley's ability to classify all func-
tions of government into three rigid categories; I do not have
that ability.3 But even if all governmental powers were easily
classifiable, I could never agree that the principle of separation
of powers, without more, is the proper tool for creating law
*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
I The four cases are Hodges v. Public Serv. Comm., 110 W. Va. 649, 159
S. E. 834 (1931) ; Baker v. County Court, 112 W. Va. 406, 164 S. E. 515 (1932) ;
Danielley v. City of Princeton, 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S. E. 620 (1933); Staud v.
Sill, 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S. E. 428 (1933). Even Mr. Donley flatly disagrees
with the Baker case. Of six existing statutes I chose as examples (all of
which I believe to be unconstitutional if the court follows its four decisions,
but all of which in my opinion should be upheld), Mr. Donley finds five un-
constitutional, in whole or in part, if the court follows all four of its decisions,
including the Baker case. See my discussion (1938) 44 W. VA. L. Q. 270,
366-69.
21 wonder whether Mr. Donley realizes that a literal interpretation of the
separation-of-powers clause would render invalid nearly every municipal charter
in West Virginia.
Compare Holmes, J., dissenting in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S.
189, 211, 48 S. Ct. 480, 72 L. Ed. 845 (1928): "It does not seem to need argu-
ment to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and
cannot carry put the distinction between legislative and executive action with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments,
were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or
that the Constitution requires,"
1
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governing the extent of review of administrative action. In my
view, the problem is intensely practical and cannot be solved by
application of logic to abstractions. I believe that the extent of
review should depend upon comparative qualifications of judges
and of administrators to decide each question-upon quality of
administrative personnel, upon adequacy of procedural safeguards
and upon political susceptibilities of particular agencies, upon
the nature of the issues to be determined, upon specialization of
judges and of administrators, and upon relative judicial and ad-
ministrative biases.4
But for Mr. Donley and me to argue about the substantive
law involved is futile.' Our difference is much deeper. Indeed,
Mr. Donley's underlying philosophy seems to me almost unbe-
lievably extreme. He apparently thinks that principles of law
exist for their own sake. In one especially revealing sentence he
sets forth the essence of his view: " . . . the statement that the
answers to twentieth century questions must be found in modern
experience . . . is a counsel of conscious intellectual hypocrisy.''6
He even goes so far as to accuse Mr. Justice Holmes7 and Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes" of this "conscious intellectual hypocrisy",
for no better reason than the willingness of those judges to look
4 Mr. Donley tries to shift the ground of the argument by making it appear
that I am favoring judicial review and that he is arguing for administrative
finality. He apparently fails to appreciate the distinction between advocatingjudicial review and advocating constitutionality of legislative provisions for
judicial review where the legislature, on grounds of policy which it finds suffi-
cient, sees fit to permit or to require judicial review.
The paradox is that anyone with Mr. Donley's general point of view should
declare himself in favor of administrative finality.
5 Because of such a fundamental cleavage between Mr. Donley's views and
mine, I choose to ignore what I believe to be his misinterpretations and mis-
understandings concerning numerous details. In the light of all his strictures,
I would now change only one word of what I have written: Mr. Donley
deserves full credit for pointing out that in one place I erroneously said
"circuit" court instead of "supreme" court.
6 Page 299.
7In criticising the "cult of modernity" for being "essentially hypo-
critical", he says at p. 298: "It says one thing and does another. The
Constitution does not mean today what it meant yesterday, nor the day before.
It shifts and changes under the sldllful manipulation of the skin-of-a-living
thought school of jurisprudence." The reference is to a statement of Mr.
.ustice Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 425, 38 S. Ct. 158, 62
L. Ed. 372 (1918): "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged,
it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."
8 In denouncing the opinion of the Chief Justice in Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 'U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 413 (1934) Mr.
Donley uses even more caustic language. He says the opinion is "a neat
example of the judicial method of having your cake and eating it too", that
2
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beyond the printed word in interpreting the Constitution. He
seems to say that "bending" a principle in order to reach a de-
sirable result is "dishonest ".10 In his view, the law is a closed
system of logic wholly divorced from reality.1'
To me, a mere summary of such views constitutes a refutation.
True, similar notions may have been prevalent at one time in the
history of the development of law. But I regard the Donley view
as a vestige of a false dogma, long rejected, especially in the realm
of public law. Advocacy of logomachy "without regard to the re-
sult reached" is the kind of lawyers' thought which does and should
bring the legal profession into disrepute.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in a passage with which I emphatically
agree, summarizes the "hypocrisy" which Mr. Donley finds so
repulsive:
" . . . when we are dealing with words that also are a con-
stituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must
realize that they have called into life a being the development
of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or
to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken their
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created
a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light
of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was
said a hundred years ago." 2
the reasoning is circular, and that "Chief Justice Hughes' words were mere
lip-service: the high priest repeating the ritual which he did not follow in
practice." I think these epithets are unjustified.
9 Before the Hodges case, the West Virginia court usually construed the
separation-of-powers clause liberally to make it workable. Thus, Judge Bran-
non, in Mackin v. County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 348-49, 18 S. E. 632 (1893)
spoke of "facility", "necessity", "expediency", and "usefulness". Appar-
ently Mr. Donley regards all such cases as "conscious intellectual hypocrisy".
He makes no analysis of the decisions prior to the Hedges case but says flatly
of them (p. 303-4): ". . . previous interpretations were unsound and the
question may be determined without reference to them."
1 Mr. Donley's sentence is: "It is preferable that a principle of law be
honestly nilsinterpreted or misapplied without regard to the result reached, than
that an expedient result be had through a dishonest bending of the principle to
justify it." (p. 299).
-Compare Cmozo, NATuRE OP THE JuDiOmI. PROCESS (1921) 46: "The
misuse of logic or philosophy begins when its method and its ends are treated
as supreme and final."
12 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 433, 40 S Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920).
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